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THE UNIFORM ACTS RELATING TO TRUSTS
ELLEN L. NYLUND *
THE NEED FOR UNIFORM LEGISLATION
V ISCOUNT Bryce in his The American Common-
wealth characterized the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the sovereignty of the separate states of the
United States somewhat as follows:
Those faults on which I have laid stress, the waste of power by
friction, the want of unity and vigour in the conduct of affairs
by executive and legislature, are the price which Americans pay
for the autonomy of their States, and for the permanence of
the equilibrium among the various branches of their government.
The want of uniformity in private law and methods of ad-
ministration is an evil which different minds will judge by dif-
ferent standards. Some may think it a positive benefit to secure
a variety which is interesting in itself and makes possible the
trying of experiments from which the whole country may profit.
Is variety within a country more a gain or a loss? Diversity in
coinage, in weights and measures, in rules regarding bills and
cheques and banking and commerce generally, is obviously
inconvenient .... In the United States, the possibility of diver-
sity of laws is immense. Subject to a few prohibitions contained
in the Constitution, each State can play whatever tricks it
pleases with the law of family relations, of inheritance, of con-
tracts, of torts, of crimes. ... But on the whole, far less inconven-
ience than could have been expected, seems to be caused by the
varying laws of different States, partly because commercial law
is the department in which the diversity is smallest, partly be-
cause American practitioners and judges have become expert
* Member of Illinois Bar.
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in applying the rule for determining which law, where those of
different States are in question, ought to be deemed to govern
a given case. However, some States have taken steps to reduce
this diversity by appointing commissions, instructed to meet and
confer as to the best means of securing uniform State legisla-
tion on some important subjects, and progress in this direction
has been made.'
To the task of making uniform the laws of the several
states the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have
devoted themselves for many years and have made
notable progress. The beneficent effect of this work has
been especially felt in the commercial fields in which
most of the uniform laws have been drawn.? More re-
cently they have embarked upon legislation dealing with
the personal and family rights and relationships, and
most recently they have ventured to make uniform the
laws of trusts.'
There has been comparatively little statute law in the
field of trusts. Trust law grew up like Topsy in the
application of well-defined principles of equity, which
grew out of the extraordinary remedies first applied in
England by the King's Chancellor5 when no legal writs
or remedriesz -were availbl for the righti-ng of obvious
wrongs and from the informality of procedure in the
ecclesiastical courts in their administration of decedents'
estates and in punishing breaches of confidence.' In this
fashion from the "uses" of English law and equity
jurisdiction we derive our present trust law.
Stemming as it does from one source, the law of trusts
in the several sovereign states has developed very much
1 (1926) I, 345.
2 Uniform Acts on Sales, Conditional Sales, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of
Lading, Negotiable Instruments, Stock Transfer, Partnership, Limited Part-
nership, Acknowledgments, Business Corporation, Arbitration, and others.
3 Uniform Marriage and Marriage License Acts, Marriage Evasion,
Illegitimacy, Guardianship, Desertion and Nonsupport and Child Labor,
Divorce Jurisdiction Acts.
4 Uniform Fiduciaries, Principal and Income, Trustees' Accounting, and
Trusts Acts.
5 F. W. Maitland, Equity (1920), pp. 43 et seq.; Holdsworth, History of
English Law, I, 449 ff.
6 See note 5 supra.
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along the same channels, with the result that, with the
possible exception of Louisiana, we can say that there
is a law of trusts for all of the states. Differences which
have arisen are not fundamental and not even by statute
have laws deviated far from the original equitable prin-
ciples other than in their interpretation. The exceptions
to this general statement are chiefly in the statutes and
are not numerous.
However, as is the case with constitutional, common
and statute law, changes of conditions, especially through
the more frequent use of trusts and the complexities of
property interest in the trust res, put a strain on the law
and precedents. These new situations demand construc-
tions not contemplated when the law or principle was
enunciated, and owing to human failings and diversities
of thought, the courts of the various states have arrived
at inconsistent results from the application of the same
principles of law or equity. So it appears that the
increasing use of express trusts has rapidly multiplied
the problems of the relationship between trustees and
cestuis que trustent and the respective rights of income
and principal beneficiaries.
Whether or not the problem of trust legislation is a
logical field for uniform state laws may be argued, but
there is undeniably a growing demand for statutory regu-
lation and a recognition of this demand.8 Some well
recognized conflict of laws rules have been developed to
apply where there is diversity of citizenship of the trustee
and settlor and to determine what law is applicable in the
administration of the trust, the jurisdiction to tax and
the rights of the cestuis.9
7 64 Trust Companies Magazine 765, Report of Committee of Southern
Division of California Bankers' Association.
8 Richard G. Stockton in 16 The Trust Bulletin 3.
9 D. F. Cavers, "Trust Inter Vivos and The Conflict of Laws," 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 163; Beale, "The Conflict of Laws," 443, 598 ff., 962, 1018 ff.;
Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65, 89 A. L. R. 1067 (1933);
Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N. W. 320 (1927).
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However, the most numerous difficulties in the creation
and administration of trusts lie not so much in the con-
flict of laws as in the lack of any rule of law applicable
or in rules of law too general in their terms to be applied
with assurance to a particular situation or statement of
facts. The ponderous motion of state legislatures in
solving these problems with patchwork legislation of
itself justifies the work of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. That this work should go so far as to change
the rules of law established between beneficiaries by the
courts of a state has been challenged by the Governor of
Pennsylvania, who vetoed the Uniform Principal and
Income Act.10
Is there a need for uniform trust laws? Uniform legis-
lation on trusts in the several states is desirable in those
matters which involve interstate transactions and a con-
flict of laws. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act is very clearly
within this classification, inasmuch as the transfer of
trust assets very frequently takes place outside of the
state where the trust is administered. This is the case
where the trust res consists of stocks of corporations
which are traded in on a few metropolitan exchanges
and where the transfer of title to the stocks is at the home
office of the corporation or by stock transfer agents in
one of three or four cities where these matters are cen-
tralized. This Act, among other things, modified the rule
that one who pays money to or transfers property for a
person acting in a fiduciary capacity has a duty to inquire
into the authority of the fiduciary and the application of
the property or proceeds. As trusts at this time very
frequently comprise investments which necessitate in-
quiry into the laws of states other than that in which the
trust is administered or in which the creator of the trust
lived, the advantage of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act to
those dealing with trustees across state boundaries is
10 "Inequities of Uniform Principal and Income Act," by Hon. George H.
Earle, Governor of Pennsylvania, 65 Trust Companies Magazine 20.
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readily appreciated. Similarly, the Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act has facilitated commercial transactions arising
out of trusts and brought benefits to the trust as well as
third parties dealing with trustee. Both of these acts
were new legislation in the sense that they did not merely
codify prevailing rules of law and iron out existing con-
flicts between the various state laws. They have, doubt-
less, been justified in large measure by the demand for
commercial expediency.
The Uniform Principal and Income Act has been
adopted in four states" and has apparently worked to
advantage in eliminating troublesome problems arising
out of fiduciary relationships and the apportionment of
receipts and disbursements between income and principal.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently
formulated two additional acts on trusts and trust admin-
istration which are respectively designated the "Uniform
Trusts Act" and the "Uniform Trustees' Accounting
Act. '"" They have not yet been enacted in any state.
All of these acts touch, at some point, matters of vital
concern to the creator of a trust, the beneficiary of a
trust, and the trustee. It appears to be appropriate to
consider in what respects benefits will be derived and
what burdens are entailed in their adoption and to what
extent they codify, extend, or deviate from the law as
now applied.
With a few specific exceptions which will be noted later,
the four acts mentioned do not fall in the category of
required legislation for commercial expediency in con-
ducting interstate transactions, nor in general do they
settle a problem of conflict of laws in determining which
11 Oregon (1931), Virginia (1936), Florida (1937), North Carolina
(1937).
12 Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act was approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August, 1936, and
revised September, 1937. Uniform Trusts Act was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in Septem-
ber, 1937.
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state law governs the trust. However, they clarify and
extend the existing state laws on certain questions and
define the exceptions to those general principles of law
where inequities have arisen. They may find their justi-
fication also in a greater ease with which reform meas-
ures can be legislated in codes and in a greater consis-
tency of a complete and carefully planned act than can
be attained by a separate consideration of each proposed
measure if introduced singly.
UNIFORM TRUSTs ACT
Section 1 of the Uniform Trusts Act concerns "Defini-
tions," about which little needs to be said. They have
been carefully drawn. The difficulties of so circumscrib-
ing the use of a term as to confine its effect to the
intended purposes, and yet to give it sufficient scope to
extend the provisions of the law to new conditions which
are within the spirit and intent of the provision, are
apparent to anyone who might study the definitions with
a view to understanding all their ramifications. The
limitations of a few of these definitions in their applica-
t;on to the .r.7wi -.. of thel 1',. edea t--, it-e
discussion of those provisions.
Section 218 bears no distinct relation to the other pro-
visions of this act. It appears to be a departure from the
common law, in that a deposit for a special purpose does
not necessarily create a trust of the credit, 4 and some of
13 "Section 2. Bank Account to Pay Special Debts..
(1) Whenever a bank account shall, by entries made on the books of the
depositor and the bank at the time of the deposit, be created exclusively for
the purpose of paying dividends, interest or interest coupons, salaries, wages,
or pensions or other benefits to employees, and the depositor at the time of
opening such account does not expressly otherwise declare, the depositor shall
be deemed a trustee of such account for the creditors to be paid therefrom,
subject to such power of revocation as the depositor may have reserved by
agreement with the bank.
(2) If any beneficiary for whom such a trust is created does not present
his claim to the bank for payment within one year after it is due, the
depositor who created such trust may revoke it as to such creditor."
14 Samuel Haas Trimmed Hat Co. v. Service Association, 222 Mo. App.
307, 297 S. W. 129 (1927) (reserve fund guaranty); Citizens Bank and
Trust Co. of Pryor v. Hale, 74 Okla. 184, 177 P. 366 (1918) (purchase price
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the preferences which it creates are not now generally
granted. 15 It is understandable that the disappointment
of numbers of investors to whom sinking fund deposits
were lost during the past few years would have suggested
the inclusion of such a provision. It carries in its wake
the problem of the legality of preferences and a ques-
tion of fraud on creditors. The purpose seems to be to
assure payment of these specially designated classes of
persons, as against general creditors, in the event of the
depositor's becoming insolvent before the deposit is paid
out. However, certain of these classes of obligees now
have a preference under the Federal Bankruptcy Law.16
Section 2 may have one unfortunate result, namely the
abrogation of the beneficent provisions of section 7 of
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.17 We have here an anom-
alous situation of a trustee, the depositor, under Section 2
having no control of the trust res, and the necessary result
of this must be that checks drawn upon this account must
be scrutinized by the bank to determine if they have been
drawn for the proper purpose. Unless intended, then, to
reimpose the duty of inquiry on the bank, the provision
that the deposit shall be irrevocable for one year after the
claim is due, unless otherwise provided, could be evaded.
The provision of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, referred
to above, sought to avoid such inquiry except where the
bank had actual knowledge of the breach of trust or had
knowledge of such facts that payment was made in bad
faith. Apart from the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, however,
there had gradually evolved the principle that for the
of real estate) ; Arlt v. Langley, 56 S. D. 79, 227 N. W. 469 (1929) (deposit
in replevin suit pending determination of ownership); Wade v. City and
County Bank, 25 Cal. App. 675, 145 P. 145 (1914) (by contractor to pay
materialmen and discharge laborers having mechanics' liens) ; McGillivray v.
First National Bank, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 150 (1927).
15 Zollman, Banks and Banking, § 3175; American Surety Co. v. Grace,
151 Tenn. 575, 271 S. W. 739 (1925) ; Cocke's Adm'r v. Loyall, 150 Va. 336,
143 S. E. 881 (1928).
16 3 U. S. C. A., Tit. 11, § 104(b).
17 I1. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 98, § 240.
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sake of commercial expediency a bank should not have the
burden of watching over the account of a trustee to look
after the use and distribution of the fund. This is irrele-
vant to the question of whether a deposit of a trustee is a
general or special deposit in the banks, upon which
authorities are at variance. 18 The purpose of section 2,
however, appears to have been to establish rights against
the depositor rather than against the bank in which the
deposit is made or against its general creditors.
In Section 319 we find enunciated the generally accepted
rule that a trustee who uses trust funds for his own pur-
poses or in such a way as to benefit himself directly 20 or
indirectly21 is guilty of a breach of his trust.
It will be noted that non-corporate trustees are pro-
hibited from lending money to a relative. Yet in Section 1,
"relative" is defined as "a spouse, ancestor, descendant,
brother or sister." It may be questioned whether Section
3 is not so limited herein as to foreclose inquiry into the
propriety of a loan by the trustee to his uncle, aunt, niece,
nephew, or cousin. While the cases decided under the
18 See 7 C. J. 633; 26 R. C. L. 1354; 8 R. C. L. Supp. 5874.
19 € €"Seto 3. Loa of. Trus Fu., n. Exep as. prvie .... .:~ Section 4,
no corporate trustee shall lend trust funds to itself or an affiliate, or to any
director, officer, or employee of itself or of an affiliate; nor shall any non-
corporate trustee lend trust funds to himself, or to his relative, employer,
employee, partner, or other business associate."
20 65 C. J. 653, n. 70; In re Randolph, 134 N. Y. S. 1117 (1911), affirmed
135 N. Y. S. 1138 (1912) ; Marion Trust and Banking Co. v. Roberson, 151
Tenn. 108, 268 S. W. 118 (1925); 1 Perry on Trusts (7th Ed.) 328; 3
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 1726 ff.; 3 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence
(4th Ed.) § 1077; King v. Remington, 36 Minn. 15, 29 N. W. 352 (1886) ;
Baldwin v. Allison, 4 Minn. 11 (1860) ; Jewett v. Miller, 10 N. Y. 402
(1852) ; Feamster v. Feamster, 35 W. Va. 1, 13 S. E. 53 (1891) ; Church v.
Winton, 196 Pa. St. 107, 46 A. 363 (1900) ; Kenworthy v. Equitable Trust
Co., 218 Pa. 286, 67 A. 469 (1907).
21 Loan by a trustee to his wife upon security of a mortgage on real
estate was objected to on the ground that the trustee could not be impartial
and could not conveniently enforce the remedy upon a default, In re Randolph,
134 N. Y. S. 1117. (1911), affirmed 135 N. Y. S. 1138 (1912); loan to a
partnership of which the trustee was a member was held improper, Penn
v. Fogler, 182 Ill. 76, 55 N. E. 192 (1899) ; to a corporation of which trustee
was the secretary was held to be a conversion, First National Bank v.
Selmser Fuel and Grain Co., 55 S. D. 586, 227 N. W. 62 (1929) ; Genesee
Wesleyan Seminary v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 247 N. Y. 52, 159
N. E. 720, 56 A. L. R. 964 (1928) ; 65 C. J. 653; Restatement of the Law of
Trusts §§ 170, 206; Perry on Trusts (7th Ed.), § 429.
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general principle of equity have apparently not gone be-
yond the classes here enumerated in holding the loan
improper, 22 it is conceivable that cases could arise where
the principle might well be extended to more remote
degrees of consanguinity if the circumstances indicated
a disloyalty to the trust. Therefore the Act might bene-
ficially have extended its language to embrace these pos-
sibilities. On the other hand, it can be said that the Act
is not intended to abrogate the general principle of equity,
which can still prevail under circumstances indicating
that a loan to a relative, other than those in the pro-
hibited classes, was made contrary to the interests of
the trust.
The provision of the Act 23 which permits a corporate
trustee to deposit in its own banking department funds
awaiting investment, distribution, or payment of debts
would resolve differences which now exist in several
states where this question has arisen. The practice has
been permitted in some cases 24 and has been held to be
22 Enright v. Sedalia Trust Co., 323 Mo. 1043, 20 S. W. (2d) 517 (1929) ;
Pierce v. Dahlgren, 300 F. 268 (1924); Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114,
123 N. E. 135 (1919) ; see note 21 supra.
23 "Section 4. Corporate Trustee Depositing Trust Funds with Self.
(1) A corporate trustee which is subject to regulation and supervision by
state or federal authorities may deposit with itself trust funds which are
being held necessarily pending investment, distribution, or the payment of
debts, provided it pays into the trust for such deposit such interest as it is
required by statute to pay on uninvested trust funds, or, if there be no such
statute, the same rate of interest it pays upon similar non-trust deposits, and
maintains in its trust department as security for all such deposits a separate
fund consisting of securities legal for trust investments and at all times equal
in total market value to the amount of the deposits. But no such security
shall be required to the extent that the deposit is insured or given a prefer-
ence by any state or federal law.
(2) The separate fund of securities shall be marked as such. Withdrawals
from or additions to it may be made from time to time, as long as the
required value is maintained. The income of such securities shall belong to
the corporate trustee. In all statements of its financial condition published,
or delivered to [the state banking department], such corporate trustee shall
show as separate items the amount of trust funds which it has deposited with
itself and the amount of securities which it holds as security for the payment
of such deposits."
24 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 1897, § 598; Bassett v. City Bank &
Trust Co., 115 Conn. 1, 160 A. 60 (1932) ; Tucker v. New Hampshire Trust
Co., 69 N. H. 187, 44 A. 927 (1897); Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 119
A. 341 (1923). In the following cases it has not been criticized, but the
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entirely improper in others.2 5 The broadening of the
Act to permit such deposits has undoubtedly been due
to the demand for business expediency and the fact that
state supervision of corporate trustees and the applica-
tion of Federal Reserve Regulation F, Section 9,26 have
been assurance against an abuse of the privilege. Al-
though it may in some cases tempt the trustee to delay
reinvestments in order to have the use of the funds, it
also makes for more efficient handling of cash balances.
Authority to make such deposits has been granted in
some states by statuteY.2  This Act goes farther than most
statutes in that it provides for a deposit of securities
equivalent in market value to the cash with the trust
department of the corporate trustee. This change from
the provisions of the tentative draft of this section, which
forbade deposit by the trustee in its own banking depart-
ment, will doubtless meet the approval of corporate trus-
tees and will offer no practical danger to the trust if the
trustee is mindful of its duty to keep trust assets produc-
tive of income.28 As a secured trust deposit it is in many
ways better protected than a deposit with another bank,
which may be regarded as a general deposit should that
bank fail.
The prohibitions in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Act,
29
trustee has been required to pay to the trust profit from the use of the funds:
In re Demmerle's Exr., 225 N. Y. S. 190 (1927) ; Matter of Haigh's Estate,
232 N. Y. S. 322 (1928); In re Estate of Moore, 211 Pa. 348, 60 A. 991
(1905) ; Reid v. Reid, 237 Pa. 176, 85 A. 85 (1912) ; Appeal of Van Dyke,
183 Pa. St. 647, 39 A. 2 (1898).
25 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 170m; note, 16 Va. L. Rev. 392.
26 This section requires that national banks shall set aside, in the trust
department, against such deposits, United States bonds or other securities
approved by the Federal Reserve Board of equivalent value.
27 California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Utah, Vermont.
28 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 1938, § 611; Perry on Trusts (7th
Ed.), Vol. I, § 452; 65 C. J. 795; Ogden v. Allan, 225 Mass. 595, 114 N. E.
862 (1917) ; Siechrist v. Bose, 87 Md. 284, 39 A. 745 (1898) ; Cheever v.
Ellis, 134 Mich. 645, 96 N. W. 1067 (1903) ; In re Jarvis, 180 N. Y. S. 324
(1920) ; Wight v. Lee, 101 Conn. 401, 126 A. 218 (1924) ; McMullen v. Sims,
37 S. W. (2d) 141 (Tex. Com. Appeals, 1931).
29 "Section 5. Trustee Buying from or Selling to Self. No trustee shall
directly or indirectly buy or sell any property for the trust from or to itself
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against a trustee dealing with himself as vendor or pur-
chaser and denying to a corporate trustee the right to
buy its own stock, are in effect a statement of the prevail-
ing law on these matters 0 which has not depended upon
the fairness of the transaction8' nor upon the fact that
the purchase was made by a third party for the trustee.
82
However, some courts have made an exception where a
trustee has purchased at a sale forced by a third party3
or in the case where the consent was obtained from the
or an affiliate; or from or to a director, officer, or employee of such trustee
or of an affiliate; or from or to a relative, employer, partner, or other
business associate."
"Section 6. Trustee Selling from One Trust to Another Trust. No
trustee shall as trustee of one trust sell property to itself as trustee of
another trust."
"Section 7. Corporate Trustee Buying Its Own Stock. No corporate
trustee shall purchase for a trust shares of its own stock, or its bonds or
other securities, or the stock, bonds or other securities of an affiliate."
30 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 170; Perry on Trusts (7th Ed.),
§ 195; 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 1722, § 543; see note, 1 A. L. R.
747. On purchases see Ball v. Hopkins, 268 Mass. 260, 167 N. E. 338 (1929) ;
Clay v. Thomas, 178 Ky. 199, 198 S. W. 762 (1917) ; In re Holley's Estate,
211 Iowa 77, 232 N. W. 807 (1930) ; Jenkins v. Hammerschlag, 56 N. Y. S.
534 (1899); Romaine v. Hendrickson, 27 N. J. Eq. 162 (1876), 28 N. J. Eq.
275 (1877); Skinnell v. Mahoney, 189 N. Y. S. 845 (1929); Ungrich v.
Ungrich, 207 N. Y. 662, 100 N. E. 1134 (1912); Gates v. Plainfield Trust
Co., 127 N. J. Eq. 460, 191 A. 304 (1937) ; Smith v. Miller, 98 Va. 535, 37 S.
E. 10 (1900); Kelsey v. Detroit Trust Co., 265 Mich. 358, 251 N. W. 555
(1933) ; Smith v. Tolversen, 190 Minn. 410, 252 N. W. 423 (1934) ; Landis
v. First National Bank of Lamanda Park, 66 P. (2d) 730 (Cal. App., 1937).
On sales to the trust see Campbell v. Campbell, 8 F. 460 (1881) ; Bermingham
v. Wilcox, 120 Cal. 467, 52 P. 822 (1898) ; Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S.
106, 35 S. Ct. 77, 59 L. Ed. 151 (1914) ; Kelly v. First Minneapolis Trust
Co., 178 Minn. 215, 226 N. W. 696 (1929) ; In re Security Bank & Trust Co.,
178 Minn. 209, 224 N. W. 235 (1929), 226 N. W. 697 (1929) ; note, 14 Minn.
L. Rev. 308; Lawndale Nat. Bank v. Kaspar American State Bank, 288 Ill.
App. 555 (1937). But see French v. Hall, 198 Mass. 147, 84 N. E. 438, 16
L. R. A. (N. S.) 205 (1908).
31 Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (1916) ; In re Long
Island Loan & Trust Co., 87 N. Y. S. 65, affirmed in 179 N. Y. 520, 71 N. E.
1133 (1904).
32 Brackenridge, Adm'r v. Holland, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 377 (1830) ; Davoue
v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252 (1816); Michoud v. Girod, 4 How.
(U. S.) 503, 11 L. Ed. 1076 (1843) ; Mitchell v. Reeder, 104 Okla. 48, 231 P.
268 (1924); Purchase v. Atd. Safe Dep. & Trust Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 344, 87 A.
444 (1912); J. H. Lane & Co. v. Maple Cotton Mill, 232 F. 421 (1916) ;
Scott v. Sierra Lbr. Co., 67 Cal. 71, 7 P. 131 (1885) ; Broder v. Conklin, 121
Cal. 282, 53 P. 699 (1898) ; French v. Woodruff, 25 Colo. 339, 54 P. 1015
(1898) ; Houston v. Bryan, 78 Ga. 181, 1 S. E. 252 (1887).
33 Allen v. Gillette, 127 U. S. 589, 8 S. Ct. 1331, 32 L. Ed. 271 (1888);
Swineford v. Virginia Trust Co., 154 Va. 751, 152 S. E. 350 (1930).
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cestuis who were sui juris24 This rule has generally been
applied to prohibit a trustee from selling to his wifel5 or
to a corporation in which he was interested."
Apart from the difficulty of proving disloyalty in the
purchase or sale by a trustee dealing with himself as
trustee of another trust, there are good practical con-
siderations which might reflect on the wisdom of denying,
in Section 6, the right of a trustee to deal with himself.
If the trustee has no beneficial interest in either trust,
the first presumption is that he would make an impartial
determination when the need for selling property from
one trust to another arises. A second consideration is
the saving of commissions to the trust. Again, the knowl-
edge that the trustee acquires of the quality of an invest-
ment in one trust might well serve the interests of the
other trust. For example, in one trust the trustee holds a
real estate mortgage; through his experience in holding
it, he will have learned the financial standing of the mort-
gagor, the appraisement value of the property mort-
gaged, and the habit for promptness of the borrower in
making interest payments. All of these factors are rele-
vant to Uetermini n gt11 helu b C1. ValIu o lf t 1heivestment11-. 1 the
trustee were required to buy from another, he would have
to rely largely on statements about them by the seller or
mortgagor. The statements of the former, with whom
34 Malone's Guardian v. Malone, 255 Ky. 210, 73 S. W. (2d) 38 (1934);
Clay v. Thomas, 178 Ky. 199, 198 S. W. 762 (1917),
35 Bassett v. Shoemaker, 46 N. J. Eq. 538, 20 A. 52 (1890) ; Scottish-
American Mortg. Co. v. Clowney, 70 S. C. 229, 49 S. E. 569, 3 Ann. Cas.
437 (1904). But see, for approval of sale to a daughter, Setaro v. Pernigotti,
105 Conn. 685, 136 A. 571 (1927).
36 Allen Robbins v. Butler, 24 I1. 387 (1860) ; Baxter v. Union Ind. Trust
& Sav. Bank, 273 Mich. 642, 263 N. W. 762 (1935) ; Birmingham v. Wilcox,
120 Cal. 467, 52 P. 822 (1898) ; H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. U. S. Bank &
Trust Co., 23 N. M. 82, 167 P. 436 (1917) ; Crawford County Bank v.
Bolton, 87 Ark. 142, 112 S. W. 398 (1908) ; In re Filardo, 221 Wis. 589, 267
N. W. 312 (1936) ; First National Bank v. Selmser Fuel & Grain Co., 55
S. D. 586, 227 N. W. 62 (1929) ; Gay v. Young Men's Consol. Coop. Merc.
Inst., 37 Utah 280, 107 P. 237 (1910) ; MacFadden v. Jenkins, 40 N. D. 422,
169 N. W. 151 (1918) ; Mann v. Bank of Greenfield, 323 Mo. 1000, 20 S. W.
(2d) 502 (1929) ; Otier v. Nieman, 160 N. Y. S. 610 (1916) ; In re
Schuster's Estate, 35 Ariz. 457, 281 P. 38 (1929). But see Van Heusen v.
Van Heusen Charles Co., 131 N. Y. S. 401 (1911).
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the trustee deals at arm's length, are likely to be unreli-
able, and those of the mortgagor are entirely self-serving.
This becomes important with the shifting of emphasis
from the security to the personal obligation. Conceivably,
a trustee might favor one trust at the expense of another,
but the likelihood of escaping the day of reckoning is so
remote that it would seemingly incline the trustee to dis-
pose of an investment of questionable value to the public
where he had no fiduciary obligations to consider.
The provision of Section 8"' granting to a trustee the
power to vote stock by proxy will be welcome to the
many trustees to whom it has not been clear to what
extent voting in this manner was a delegation of a dis-
cretionary power or personal confidence, and the con-
scientious trustee is mindful that the delegation of a dis-
cretionary duty is a breach of trust.88 Except in a limited
number of trusts where a trustee may have a controlling
interest, the interest of the trustee is proportionately
small, and the inconvenience of attending meetings of
stockholders is great. Most trustees, if they vote by
proxies at all, limited them to voting for named directors
and to specific questions presented in advance of the
meeting. The qualification upon this grant of authority
will doubtless prevent the giving of general proxies.
A need has existed for authority to have stock, for
which there is a general market, issued in the name of a
nominee. Section 939 authorizes this practice. Although
37 "Section 8. Voting Stock. A trustee owning corporate stock may
vote it by proxy, but shall be liable for any loss resulting to the beneficiaries
from a failure to use reasonable care in deciding how to vote the stock and
in voting it."
38 65 C. J. 665; Perry on Trusts (7th Ed.), § 408; 3 Bogert on Trusts
and Trustees 1763, § 555; Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 171;
McCollister v. Bishop, 78 Minn. 228, 80 N. W. 1118 (1899); Meck v.
Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 P. 91 (1927); Coleman v. Connolly, 242 Ill.
574, 90 N. E. 278 (1909) ; Spengler v. Kuhn, 212 Ill. 186, 72 N. E. 214
(1904) ; Markel v. Peck, 144 Mo. App. 701, 129 S. W. 243 (1910).
39 "Section 9. Holding Stock in Name of Nominee. A trustee owning
stock may hold it in the name of a nominee, without mention of the trust
in the stock certificate or stock registration book; provided that (1) the
trust records and all reports or accounts rendered by the trustee clearly
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the Uniform Fiduciaries Act provides for the transfer of
stock held in the name of a trustee without inquiry into
the trust terms,4" provided no facts shall come to the
knowledge of the transfer agent which would indicate bad
faith in the making of the transfer, the marketability of
stock issued in the name of a trustee has been lessened
by the fact that stocks issued to and endorsed by the
trustee are not generally accepted as negotiable in form.
Although the Uniform Fiduciaries Act has been adopted
by many of the states of the Union, and although a trans-
fer may take place in a state which has adopted the Uni-
form Fiduciaries Act, transfer agents have been reluc-
tant to rely upon the Uniform Fiduciaries Act without in-
vestigating the provisions of the trust and the power to
make the sale. Furthermore, purchasers will not readily
assume the burden of transfer when a fiduciary is the
owner and time consuming delay may sometimes mean
great changes in market values when the sale is finally
consummated. Trustees have been prevented from tak-
ing the expedient course of having the stock issued to
themselves without designation of the trust, for they
thereby made themselves the insurer of the invest.menDt
and committed a technical breach of trust. 1 Having the
show the ownership of the stock by the trustee and the facts regarding
its holding; and (2) the nominee shall deposit with the trustee a signed
statement showing the trust ownership, shall endorse the stock certificate in
blank, and shall not have possession of the stock certificate or access thereto
except under the immediate supervision of the trustee. The trustee shall be
personally liable for any loss to the trust resulting from any act of such
nominee in connection with stock so held."
40 "Section 3. Registration of Transfer of Securities Held by
Fiduciaries. If a fiduciary in whose name are registered any shares of
stock, bonds or other securities of any corporation, public or private, or
company or other association, or of any trust, transfers the same, such cor-
poration or company or other association, or any of the managers of the trust,
or its or their transfer agent, is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is
committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in making the transfer, or
to see to the performance of the fiduciary obligation, and is liable for
registering such transfer only where registration of the transfer is made
with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his
obligation as fiduciary in making the transfer, or with knowledge of such
facts that the action in registering the transfer amounts to bad faith."
41 White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897) ; Gilbert v. Welsch,
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stock issued in the name of a nominee is for the manifest
benefit of the trust estate, but the penalty imposed by
Section 9 upon the trustee, as a guarantor that there will
be no defalcations by the nominee, puts an unreasonably
heavy burden upon him, except where he, individually,
is the nominee and, as a result, trustees may be de-
terred from making use of this provision except where
such matters can be absolutely controlled. It would
seem to be fair to both cestuis and the trustee to require
the trustee to exercise only reasonable care to avoid a
loss to the trust estate from the use of a nominee. The
provision contemplates a corporate trustee's using in-
dividuals as nominees or an individual trustee's using
another individual as the nominee, for it requires a
segregation of possession and access thereto from the
nominee. This would, it is submitted, prevent an individ-
ual trustee from having stock issued in his own name
without reference to the trust.
Where the trustee has been given powers which require
the exercise of discretion or judgment, it has frequently
been held that such discretionary power does not vest in
a successor trustee. 2 The term "discretionary powers,"
however, is one which may be as elastic as the term
"duties of the trustee." It has therefore been difficult
to define the limitations upon the authority of the succes-
sor trustee. Although it may be presumed that in view
of the position of trust which this relationship implies,
the selection of the trustee, in all cases, is predicated
upon and determined by the confidence which the settlor
has in the trustee he selects. When the trustee is a cor-
75 Ind. 557 (1881) ; Chapter House Circle v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust
Co., 121 Conn. 558, 186 A. 543 (1936) ; De Jarnette v. De Jarnette, 41 Ala.
708 (1868); Knowlton v. Bradley, 17 N. H. 458 (1845); In re Hodges'
Estate, 66 Vt. 70, 28 A. 663 (1894).
42 65 C. J. 673 ff.; 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 1743, § 553; note, 13
Minn. L. Rev. 164; Whitaker v. McDowell, 82 Conn. 195, 72 A. 938 (1909) ;
Tilley v. Letcher, 203 Ala. 277, 82 So. 527 (1919) ; Jones v. Bevillard, 20S
N. Y. 446, 103 N. E. 719 (1913) ; Hazard v. Bacon, 42 R. I. 415, 108 A. 499
(1920).
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poration and there is no assurance that the personnel
will continue to be the same, Section 1043 appears to be
a very timely change in law and to be substantially in
conformity with the settlor's wishes. In granting powers
or authority to the trustee, the settlor has in mind not
so much making it easier for the trustee to administer the
trust estate as he has in mind the benefits which will
accrue from giving a discretionary power which will per-
mit an adjustment to changing circumstances and the
changing needs of the beneficiaries. Few settlors, or
lawyers who prepare the instrument creating the trust,
after giving the matter considerable attention, consider
themselves wise enough to anticipate all the needs of the
trust administration and of the beneficiaries for an ex-
tended period of time. In some cases the courts have
been very generous in finding the intent to have the dis-
cretionary powers vest in the office of trustee rather than
merely in the individual or corporation which was named
as first trustee. But the result of this is too great an un-
certainty to be satisfactory.
Some states have by statute"4 provided for the action
of the majority of three or more trustees with tuile saving
benefits of Section 11 of this Act. 5 This has great prac-
tical advantages, for it facilitates action by the trustees
when action is desirable, permits an adjustment to the
43 "Section 10. Powers Attached to Office. Unless it is otherwise pro-
vided by the trust instrument, or an amendment thereof, or by court order,
all powers of a trustee shall be attached to the office and shall not be
personal."
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 148, § 33.
45 "Section 11. Powers Exercisable by Majority.
(1) Unless it is otherwise provided by the trust instrument, or an amend-
ment thereof, or by court order, any power vested in three or more trustees
may be exercised by a majority of such trustees; but no trustee who has not
joined in exercising a power shall be liable to the beneficiaries or to others
for the consequences of such exercise, nor shall a dissenting trustee be
liable for the consequences of an act, in which he joins at the direction of the
majority trustees, if he expressed his dissent in writing to any of his
co-trustees at or before the time of such joinder.
(2) Nothing in this section shall excuse a co-trustee from liability for
inactivity in the administration of the trust nor for failure to attempt to
prevent a breach of trust."
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idiosyncrasies of any individual trustee for or against
certain investments, and seems to be what most settlors
have in mind when they designate three or more trustees.
There is a protection to the trust estate in paragraph (2),
for under its provision the dissenting trustee is not re-
lieved from responsibility to attempt to prevent the
majority of the trustees from breaching their trust or
acting in a manner wholly inconsistent with good judg-
ment. It would be incumbent upon the dissenting trustee
to prevent such conduct by a timely court interference.
At the same time this paragraph also prevents a trustee,
who finds he disagrees with his co-trustees, from adopt-
ing the arbitrary attitude that, since they are not agree-
able, he will do nothing.
At common law, since the law courts did not recognize
the trust relationship, the judgment, in an action against
the trustee for breach of a contract intra vires the trust,
was against the trustee personally, and execution issued
on the judgment against his individual property instead
of against the trust estate. 6 In such an event the trustee
was, in equity, allowed to reimburse himself from the
trust property. Through the theory of subrogation 7 or
unjust enrichment, 8 the creditor might reach the trust
46 Petition of Eddy, 6 F. (2d) 196 (1925) ; Fay v. Day, 106 Neb. 370, 183
N. W. 565 (1921) ; Stanton Nat. Bank v. Swallow, 113 Neb. 336, 203 N. W.
561 (1925) ; Head v. Porter, 240 S. W. 685 (Tex., 1922) ; Allegheny Tank
Car Co. v. Culbertson, 288 F. 406 (1923) ; Carr v. Leahy, 217 Mass. 438, 105
N. E. 445 (1914) ; Knipp v. Bagby, 126 Md. 461, 95 A. 60 (1915) ; Austin v.
Parker, 317 Ill. 348, 148 N. E. 19 (1925) ; Taylor v. Mayo, 110 U. S. 330,
4 S. Ct. 147, 28 L. Ed. 163 (1884); Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading
Co. v. Seward, 2 N. E. (2d) 448 (Mass., 1936); In re Ruggles' Est., 275
Mich.. 237, 266 N. W. 332 (1936) ; Kincaid v. Hensel, 185 Wash. 503, 55 P.
(2d) 1050 (1936).
4T See 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 1743, § 553; Restatement of the
Law of Trusts, § 268; Hilton's Adm'x v. Porter-Matlock Trust Co., 230 Ky.
401, 19 S. W. (2d) 1088 (1929) ; King v. Stowell, 211 Mass. 246, 98 N. E.
91 (1912) ; Mason v. Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 164, 24 N. E. 202 (1890); In re
Rosenfeldt's Will, 185 Minn. 425, 241 N. W. 573 (1932) ; Norton v. Phelps,
54 Miss. 467 (1877).
48 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 2117, 2154, § 715, § 725; Restatement
of the Law of Trusts, § 269; Newell v. Hadley, 206 Mass. 335, 92 N. E. 507
(1910) ; Mannix v. Purcell, 46 Ohio St. 102, 19 N. E. 572 (1888) ; Field v.
Wilbur, 49 Vt. 157 (1876) ; Yerkes v. Richards, 170 Pa. St. 346, 32 A. 1089
(1895) ; Scheibeler v. Albee, 99 N. Y. S. 706 (1906) ; Manderson's Appeal,
113 Pa. St. 631, 6 A. 893 (1886).
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property in a proceeding in equity, but unless the trustee
expressly contracted to be liable only as trustee and out
of trust assets, 1 the creditor must, if it was possible,
first have procured a judgment at law against the trustee
in order to be entitled to subrogation. Section 12 of this
Act,50 in permitting a judgment and execution against the
trust estate, obviates the time- and money-wasting double
procedure. But where the trustee's contract is ultra vires
and recovery cannot be obtained at law against the trus-
tee, the creditor's only right against the estate will be, as
formerly, in equity on the theory of unjust enrichment,5
for this section covers only contracts made within the
trustee's power.
49 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 271; Schumann-Heink v. Folsom,
328 Ill. 321, 159 N. E. 250 (1927) ; Adams v. Swig, 234 Mass. 584, 125 N. E.
857 (1920); Breid v. Mintrup, 203 Mo. App. 567, 219 S. W. 703 (1920);
Brackett v. Foulds, 110 N. Y. S. 779 (1908) ; Shoe & Leather Nat. Bank v.
Dix, 123 Mass. 148 (1877).
50 "Section 12. Contracts of Trustee.
(1) Whenever a trustee shall make a contract which is within his powers
as trustee, or a predecessor trustee shall have made such a contract, and a
cause of action shall arise thereon, the party in whose favor the cause of
action has accrued may sue the trustee in his representative capacity, and any
judgment rendered in such action in favor of the plaintiff shall be collectible
[by execution] out of the trust property. In such an action the plaintiff need
not prove that the trustee could have secured reimbursement from the trust
fund if he had paid the plaintiff's claim.
(2) No judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in such action
unless he proves that within thirty days after the beginning of such action, or
within such other time as the court may fix, and more than thirty days prior
to obtaining the judgment, he notified each of the beneficiaries known to the
trustee who then had a present interest, or in the case of charitable trust the
[Attorney-General] and any corporation which is a beneficiary or agency in
the performance of such charitable trust, of the existence and nature of the
action. Such notice shall be given by mailing copies thereof in postpaid
envelopes addressed to the parties to be notified at their last known addresses.
The trustee shall furnish the plaintiff a list of the parties to be notified, and
their addresses, within ten days after written demand therefor, and notifica-
tion of the persons on such list shall constitute compliance with the duty
placed on the plaintiff by this section. Any beneficiary, or in the case of
charitable trusts the [Attorney-General] and any corporation which is a
beneficiary or agency in the performance of such charitable trust, may
intervene in such action and contest the right of the plaintiff to recover.
(3) The plaintiff may also hold the trustee who made the contract per-
sonally liable on such contract, if the contract does not exclude such personal
liability. The addition of the word 'trustee' or the words 'as trustee' after
the signature of a trustee to a contract shall be deemed prima facie evidence
of an intent to exclude the trustee from personal liability."
51 See note 48 supra.
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Under the existing practice, if the trustee reimburses
himself from the trust assets, the cestuis may make ob-
jections thereto when the trustee files his account. But if
the trustee, instead of reimbursing himself (an extra-
judicial act), transfers trust funds to a judgment credi-
tor under a writ of execution or pursuant to court order,
the cestuis could not so readily object to the propriety of
the trustee's act and his account would no doubt be ap-
proved. Paragraph (2) of Section 12, requiring the
creditor to give notice to the beneficiaries of the existence
and nature of the action, gives the beneficiaries an oppor-
tunity to safeguard their interests. This might be a need-
less precaution if it might always be assumed that the
trustee would not be indifferent in his defense of the
suit. No doubt his lack of diligence could be considered
a breach of trust for which he would be accountable, but
this is not always a fact easy to prove. Since a personal
judgment will not be entered against the trustee, he has
not the same incentive to resist the plaintiff's claim. In
view of the untold possibilities which could arise to jeop-
ardize the interests of the beneficiaries, the requirement
of notice seems to be a wise precaution.
In suits for tort, as in suits on contract, the law courts
have not generally recognized the liability of a trust
estate.2 A judgment in a tort action, therefore, has as a
rule been collectible solely out of the private property of
the trustee. The modern trend, however, is in the direc-
tion of liability as trustees in those cases where there has
been an unjust enrichment,53 where the wrongful act was
52 Wahl v. Schmidt, 307 Ill. 331, 138 N. E. 604 (1923) ; Louisville Trust
Co. v. Morgan, 180 Ky. 609, 203 S. W. 555 (1918); T. L. Horn Trunk .Co. v.
Delano, 162 Mo. App. 402, 142 S. W. 770 (1912); Keating v. Stevenson, 47
N. Y. S. 847 (1897) ; Trani v. Gerard, 168 N. Y. S. 808 (1918); McCue v.
Finck, 46 N. Y. S. 242 (1897); O'Toole v. Faulkner, 29 Wash. 544, 70 P.
58 (1902).
53 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 269; 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1122;
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Ch. 34; In re Hunter, 151 F. 904 (1907) ;
Miller v. Smythe, 92 Ga. 154, 18 S. E. 46 (1893) ; Grimes y. Barndollar, 58
Colo. 421, 148 P. 256 (1914) ; Bright Nat. Bank v. Hanson, 68 Ind. App. 61,
113 N. E. 434 (1916).
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the act of an agent properly employed by the trustee, 54
where the tort liability is not based on negligence," or
where the obligation arises out of a tort committed in the
usual course of the business conducted by the trustee
with the trust property (although the trustee may have
been negligent) and a benefit resulted to the trust estate
by reason of the act.5" There seems to be even more rea-
son for the protection to the trust estate by requiring
notice to the cestuis in tort actions, as provided in Section
14 of this Act,57 than in the case of contracts, for, since
54 See note 53; Prinz v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 309 (1905) ; Wright v.
Caney River Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 529, 66 S. E. 588 (1909).
55 Ireland v. Bowman & Cockrell, 130 Ky. 153, 113 S. W. 56 (1908)
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Ch. 34.
56 Smith v. Coleman, 100 Fla. 1707, 132 So. 198 (1931) ; In re Raybould,
[1900] 1 Ch. 199; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Ch. 34.
57 "Section 14. Tort Liability of Trust Estate.
"(1) Where a trustee or his predecessor has incurred personal liability
for a tort committed in the course of his administration, the trustee in his
representative capacity may be sued and collection had from the trust prop-
erty, if the court shall determine in such action that (1) the tort was a
common incident of the kind of business activity in which the trustee or his
predecessor was properly engaged for the trust; or (2) that, although the
tort was not a common incident of such activity, neither the trustee nor his
predecessor, nor any officer or employee of the trustee or his predecessor,
was guilty of personal fault in incurring the liability; or (3) that, although
the tort did not fall within classes (1) or (2) above, it increased the value
of the trust property. If the tort is within classes (1) or (2) above, collec-
tion may be had of the full amount of damage proved, and if the tort is
within class (3) above, collection may be had only to the extent of the
increase in the value of the trust property.
"(2) In an action against the trustee in his representative capacity under
this section the plaintiff need not prove that the trustee could have secured
reimbursement from the trust fund if he had paid the plaintiff's claim.
"(3) No judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in such action
unless he proves that within thirty days after the beginning of the action, or
within such other period as the court may fix and more than thirty days prior
to obtaining the judgment, he notified each of the beneficiaries known to the
trustee who then had a present interest of the existence and nature of the
action. Such notice shall be given by mailing copies thereof in postpaid
envelopes addressed to such beneficiaries at their last known addresses. The
trustee shall furnish the plaintiff a list of such beneficiaries and their
addresses, within ten days after written demand therefor, and notification of
the persons on such list shall constitute compliance with the duty placed on
the plaintiff by this section. Any beneficiary may intervene in such action
and contest the right of the plaintiff to recover.
"(4) The trustee may also be held personally liable for any tort committed
by him, or by his agents or employees in the course of their employments,
subject to the rights of exoneration or reimbursement provided in Section 13.
"(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to change the existing law
with regard to the liability of trustees of charitable trusts for torts of them-
selves or their employees."
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the trustee might become personally liable if the trust
were exonerated, he would have an interest which would
motivate his being less diligent in disproving the tort
liability of the trust estate. Although the insurance avail-
able for public liability has relieved the trustee to some
extent from the damages accruing as a result of torts
arising from attractive nuisances, elevator accidents, and
the like, it none the less has seemed inequitable in many
cases that the trustee should personally be obligated for
these liabilities. Especially is this true if the trustee has
no power of sale and the trust assets consist principally
of real estate, for he would be handicapped in reimburs-
ing himself for the loss.
Section 1558 resolves the question of distribution of
losses when the trustee has breached his trust by min-
gling trust funds and has become insolvent. There is
respectable authority for the position that when trust
funds are mingled, the entire fund is impressed with the
trust,59 that in the event of withdrawals from a commin-
gled fund the trustee will be presumed to be honest and
to have withdrawn his own funds first;6° and that if
58 "Section 15. Withdrawals from Mingled Trust Funds. Where a
person who is a trustee of two or more trusts has mingled the funds of two
or more trusts in the same aggregate of cash, or in the same bank or
brokerage account or other investment, and a withdrawal is made therefrom
by the trustee for his own benefit, or for the benefit of a third person not a
beneficiary or creditor of one or more of the trusts, or for an unknown
purpose, such a withdrawal shall be charged first to the amount of cash,
credit, or other property of the trustee in the mingled fund, if any, and after
the exhaustion of the trustee's cash, credit, or other property, then to the
several trusts in proportion to their several interests in the cash, credit, or
other property at the time of the withdrawal."
59 65 C. J. 973; Halle v. Nat. Park Bank of New York, 140 Ill. 413, 29
N. E. 727 (1892) ; Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 91 N. E. 332 (1910) ;
Kineon v. Bonsall, 185 N. Y. S. 694 (1920); Tooele County Board of
Education v. Hadlock, 79 Utah 478, 11 P. (2d) 320 (1932) ; In re Hallett's
Est., 13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879); Byrne v. McGrath, 130 Cal. 316, 62 P. 559
(1900).
60 4 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 2678, § 926; 65 C. J. 975; In re
Stenning, [1895] 2 Ch. 433; Theodore Hamm Brewing Co. v. Flagstad, 182
Iowa 826, 166 N. W. 289 (1918); Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Il. 104, 64
N. E. 292 (1902); Moore v. Mansfield, 248 Mass. 210, 142 N. E. 792 (1924);
Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 91 N. E. 332 (1910) ; Board of Fire and
Water Com'rs of Marquette v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 655, 78 N. W. 893, 44
L. R. A. 493 (1899).
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funds of several trusts are involved, they will share pro-
portionately in the commingled fund. 1
If A makes a conveyance of land to B upon B's oral
promise to hold it in trust for A, the trust is unenforce-
able, under the Statute of Frauds 2 Section 16 of this
Act' would give A a right to a reconveyance. Professor
Bogert points out that courts of many states have already
gone a long way to enforce an oral trust of real estate by
decreeing a constructive trust on the ground that B's acts
were fraudulent64 ,or on the ground of unjust enrichment,
based upon a failure of consideration 65 as well as in the
exceptional cases where the conveyance was induced by
confidential relationship, misrepresentation, contempla-
tion of death, or where there has been part performance.
This appears to have a desirable result, but an express
61 4 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 2678, § 926; General Motors Accep-
tance Corp. v. Larson, 110 N. J. Eq. 305, 159 A. 819 (1932); Andrew v.
Farmers' Say. Bank of Goldfield, 207 Iowa 394, 223 N. W. 249 (1929);
Central Auto Tire Co. v. Com. of Banks, 252 Mass. 363, 148 N. E. 226
(1925) ; In re Walter J. Schmidt & Co., 298 F. 314 (1923) ; Cunningham v.
Brown, 265 U. S. 1, 44 S. Ct. 424, 68 L. Ed. 873 (1923). But see contra,
Downing v. Cunningham, 256 Mass. 285, 152 N. E. 365 (1926) ; Spokane
County v. First Nat. Bank, 68 F. 979 (1895).
62 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 59, § 9: "All declarations or creations of trusts
or confidences of any lands, tenements or heretaentst, shall be _anIfsted
and proved by some writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to
declare such trust, or by his last will in writing; or else they shall be utterly
void and of no effect: Provided, that resulting trust or trusts created by
construction, implication or operation of law, need not be in writing, and
the same may be proved by parol."
63 "Section 16. Unenforceable Oral Trust Created by Deed.
(1) When an interest in real property is conveyed by deed to a person
on a trust which is unenforceable on account of the Statute of Frauds and
the intended trustee or his successor in interest still holds title but refuses
to carry out the trust on account of the Statute of Frauds, the intended
trustee or his successor in interest, except to the extent that the successor in
interest is a bona fide purchaser of a legal interest in the real property in
question, shall be under a duty to convey the interest in real property to the
settlor or his successor in interest. A court having jurisdiction may
prescribe the conditions upon which the interest shall be conveyed to the
settlor or his successor in interest.
(2) Where the intended trustee has transferred part or all of his interest
and it has come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, the intended trustee
shall be liable to the settlor or his successor in interest for the value of the
interest thus transferred at the time of its transfer, less such offsets as the
court may deem equitable."
64 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 1588, note 22 and cases cited.
05 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 1590-1, notes 31 and 32.
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repeal of the objectionable section of the Statute of
Frauds would seem to be preferable to indirect revoca-
tion by an inconsistent separate statute.
In restricting the settlor's right to waive the applica-
tion of this Act6" upon his trust to Section 6 to 15 inclu-
sive of this Act, the Committee may have had it in mind
that waivers might be inserted by the settlor, where a
corporation is to be the trustee, without his considering
the possible results. Not infrequently, however, an indi-
vidual with whom the testator was engaged in business
up to the time of his death is named as testamentary
trustee. This individual may be the logical one to pur-
chase the testator's interest in the business, but under
this Act he could not do so, even with a prior court
approval unless he anticipated his difficulties and de-
clined to act as trustee. A trust will not fail for lack of
a trustee, but the testator had confidence in the trustee
he named, and he expected his trust to benefit by the
selection. The problem resolves itself into the question
of which situation presents the greater evil. It must
not be supposed that settlors are incapable of under-
standing a waiver of their rights or that they waive such
rights as a matter of course without inquiry or consider-
ation.
This Act has made a commendable contribution toward
codifying the law of trusts; but it could, in the writer's
opinion, have been made much more helpful had it cov-
ered such topics as the rule against perpetuities, accumu-
66 "Section 17. Power of Settlor.
"The settlor of any trust affected by this Act may, by provision in the
instrument creating the trust if the trust was created by a writing, or by oral
statement to the trustee at the time of the creation of the trust if the trust
was created orally, or by an amendment of the trust if the settlor reserved
the power to amend the trust, relieve his trustee from any or all of the duties,
restrictions, and liabilities which would otherwise be imposed upon him by
this Act; or alter or deny to his trustee any or all of the privileges and
powers conferred upon the trustee by this Act; or add duties, restrictions,
liabilities, privileges, or powers, to those imposed or granted by this Act; but
no act of the settlor shall relieve a trustee from the duties, restrictions, and
liabilities imposed upon him by Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this Act."
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lation of income, the requirements for valid charitable
gifts, spendthrift trust limitations, essential require-
ments to exercising powers of appointment over trust
property, and authorized trust investments. It is in
problems arising under these headings that the greatest
diversity of law occurs among the states, and it is these
problems which are of vital interest to the creator of a
trust. When a testator living in Illinois makes a will
creating a testamentary trust, valid and effective under
Illinois laws, and when he later moves to another state
and dies shortly thereafter, his trust may be invalid be-
cause it violates the rule of that state against remoteness
in vesting, or the trust created by his will may violate the
laws of the state of his last domicile in any or all of these
other features, which are so fundamental to the scheme
of the trust he sets up. No doubt greater opposition
would be raised to an Act which was not in accord with
the present laws of a state on those questions, but since
these are the subjects of controversy when the laws of
several states are involved, it is submitted, they furnish
the material for a Uniform Act which would have been
of greater service.
UNIFORM TRUSTEES' ACCOUNTING ACT
Apart from statutory provisions, trustees are now re-
quired to account for their handling of trust assets, their
receipts and disbursements.67 But no form nor time for
such accounting is required. An accounting may be
demanded by anyone who has a beneficial interest in the
trust, 8 including a contingent beneficiary, 9 and by co-
67 4 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 2780-9, §§ 961-3; Perry on Trusts
(7th Ed.), § 821; 65 C. J. 878; Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 172;
Freeman v. Donohoe, 65 Cal. App. 65, 223 P. 431 (1924) ; Smallwood v.
Lawson, 183 Ky. 189, 208 S. W. 808 (1919) ; Ingram v. Lewis, 37 F. (2d)
259, 70 A. L. R. 702 (1930) ; Madison Trust Co. v. Carnegie Trust Co., 152
N. Y. S. 517 (1915) Boyer v. Day, 132 Kan. 722, 297 P. 432 (1931);
Maxwell's Unknown Heirs v. Bolding, 36 S. W. (2d) 267 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1931) ; Wylie v. Bushnell, 277 Ill. 484 115 N. E. 618 (1917).
68 Bennett v. Weber, 323 11. 283, 154 N. E. 105 (1926). Committee of a
lunatic: Ex parte Nicholas, 142 Md. 601, 121 A. 627 (1923). Administrator
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trustees. 70 Failure to account upon demand is ground for
removal of the trustee.71
Most of the states, by statute, require that the trustee
of testamentary trusts shall render an account in some
court. Several states set the time for rendering accounts,
but only a few states specify what shall be included in
the account. 72 However, any person who is entitled to an
accounting may question items of the account and require
proof with regard to them or demand additional facts
disclosing the trustee's acts.
73
When such accounts are voluntarily rendered or are
rendered upon a demand which does not specify the in-
formation desired, unless it is required to do so by
statute, it is unlikely that a trustee will disclose facts
which prove his breach of duty. But the trustee can be
required to answer questions about the administration to
bring this out.
The provisions of this Uniform Trustees' Accounting
Act are so comprehensive that if an account is made in
accordance with it, without fraud or mistake, it should
disclose to those who are interested any self dealing and
the complete story of the administration of the trust. It
has the very desirable feature of making each account-
ing final as to the facts which it discloses and would
permit trustees to terminate questions of liability. This
practice might be desired when a trust is likely to con-
tinue for a generation or longer.
of a deceased beneficiary: Stuck v. Schumm, 290 Mass. 159, 194 N. E. 895
(1935) ; Brown v. Ricks, 30 Ga. 777 (1860) ; In re Ralph's Estate, 155
N. Y. S. 147 (1915) ; In re Wheeler's Estate, 287 Pa. 416, 135 A. 252
(1926). Residuary legatee: Cavert v. Ferrell, 123 Kan. 254, 255 P. 62
(1927) ; In re Wheeler's Estate, 287 Pa. 416, 135 A. 252 (1926).
69 Furniss v. Furniss, 133 N. Y. S. 535 (1911) ; Meeks v. Meeks, 100
N. Y. S. 667 (1906); White v. White, 25 S. W. (2d) 826 (Tex. Com. App.,
1930) ; In re Dority, 57 N. Y. S. 1073 (1899).
70 Vose v. Galpen, 18 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 96 (1864).
71 Knowlton v. Fourth-Atlantic Nat. Bank, 271 Mass. 343, 171 N. E. 721
(1930) ; Appeal of Morse, 92 Conn. 286, 102 A. 586 (1917).
72 Conn., Mass., N. Y., Del., N. J., Pa., and Dist. of Columbia.
73 65 C. J. 935, 4 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees 2780, § 961; Perrin v.
Lepper, 72 Mich. 454, 40 N. W. 859 (1888) ; In re Scott's Estate, 202 Pa.
389, 51 A. 1023 (1902) ; Woolf v. Barnes, 93 N. Y. S. 219 (1904).
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In considering this Act, however, one should bear in
mind that an accounting in itself will not assure the
proper administration of a trust unless the beneficiaries
concerned are competent to determine from the account-
ing whether or not the trust has been properly handled
or unless they retain legal counsel or accountants to
check these accounts. This is particularly true in those
cases where large estates are involved and the account-
ings become complicated and lengthy. It is not to be sup-
posed that the court will undertake to check each item
to determine that there has been a proper administration
unless objection is raised by the beneficiary to the allow-
ance of the account. But the fact that the account is to
be made under oath and is required to show74 "that
neither any seller of [to], nor buyer from, the trustee"
was a person related by blood or marriage or connected
with him in business and is required to show sources of
purchases75 would tend to deter the trustee from making
intentional misstatements, for he would be guilty of per-
jury. Paragraph (e) of Section 3 of this Act 78 has been
7 "Section 3. Intermediate Accoun'ngs. ith_in t.:L ..... safte
the expiration of the first year after the first qualifying testamentary trustee
was under a duty to file his inventory as prescribed in Section 2 the
testamentary trustee then in office shall file with the [probate court of the
county where the will was admitted to probate] an intermediate account
under oath covering such year and showing ... " See footnotes following
for subsections.
75 "(c) in a separate schedule the trust principal on hand at the beginning
of the accounting period and the then status of its investment; the invest-
ments received from the settlor and still held; additions to trust principal
during the accounting period with the dates and sources of acquisition; invest-
ments collected, sold or charged off during the accounting period, with the
consequent loss or gain and whether credited to principal or income, invest-
ments made during the accounting period, with the date, source and cost of
each; deductions from principal during the accounting period, with the date
and purpose of each; and trust principal on hand at the end of the accounting
period, how invested, and the estimated market value of each investment .. "
76 "(e) that neither any seller of, nor buyer from, the trustee of trust
property during the accounting period was at the time of such sale or
purchase (1) in the case of a corporate trustee an affiliate, or any officer,
employee, or nominee of the trustee or of an affiliate; or was (2) in the case
of a non-corporate trustee a relative, partner, employer, employee, or business
associate; but none of the provisions of this subsection shall apply to pur-
chases and sales made by brokers for the trustee or stock exchanges. .. ."
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made more effective by the revision of 1937 by substitut-
ing the words "that neither" for "whether." This re-
quires an affirmative statement by the trustee that no
transaction such as described has taken place, where, as
it was formerly stated, it might have been construed that
a failure to make a statement on the matter, although
one was required, was no perjury.
This Trustees' Accounting Act will very materially
increase the cost of the administration of trusts. Not
only will there, in all likelihood, be an increase in the
trustee's fees, but there will be the court costs, attorney's
fees in presenting the account, and possibly fees of attor-
neys of the beneficiaries or of certified public accountants
employed by the beneficiaries. This additional cost will,
of course, reduce the income payable to the income bene-
ficiaries, and may be a factor to be considered by the
settlor of the trust in determining the advisability of
making outright distributions rather than trust pro-
visions. There is however, in Section 15, 7 a right in the
settlor to waive this duty of the trustee to account, and in
Section 16, 78 a power in a beneficiary who is sui juris to
waive the account. In this connection it should be noted
that, in the usual family trust situation, it is unlikely that
remainder beneficiaries would all be in being and sui
juris at a time when such a waiver might be desirable.
77 "Power of Settlor. The settlor of any trust affected by this Act
may, by provision in the instrument creating the trust, if the trust was
created by a writing, or by oral statement to the trustee at the time of the
creation of the trust if the trust was created orally, or by an amendment of
the trust if the settlor reserved the power to amend the trust, relieve his
trustee from any or all of the duties which would otherwise be placed upon
him by this Act, or add duties to those imposed by this Act on his trustee
with regard to inventories and accountings. But no expression of intent
by any settlor shall affect the jurisdiction of the courts of this State over
inventories and accounts of trustees, in so far as such jurisdiction does not
depend upon the provisions of this Act."
78 "Power of Beneficiary. Any beneficiary, if of full age and sound
mind, may, if acting upon full information, by written instrument delivered to
the trustee, excuse the trustee as to such beneficiary from performing any
of the duties imposed on him by this Act or exempt the trustee from liability
to such beneficiary for failure to perform any of the duties imposed upon
the trustee by the terms of this Act."
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It might have been feasible to provide that during the
period that income is payable to beneficiaries, the waiver
by the income beneficiaries alone will be sufficient to
relieve the trustee of liability to render court accountings.
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
The Uniform Principal and Income Act has already
been adopted in four states. Out of the need for cer-
tainty in trust administration, arbitrary rules are made
in defining the rights of the life tenant and remainder-
man. The reason given by the Governor of Pennsylvania
for vetoing the act79 was that the Act favored the remain-
derman at the expense of the life tenants and permitted
the accumulation of larger trust estates with the con-
sequent diminishing of income to life tenants.
The Uniform Principal and Income Act does have
the virtue of simplicity of application, and it meets some
very trying problems in determining the apportionment
of income and principal upon the death of a life tenant
upon which courts have not been in complete accord.
It is provided in Section 280 that if the settlor of the
~ u~, InA~~ ~uv11v~icuniaiy bu 1d1kz piLuviniuiin 0I HieL
Act, the Act shall not control. Section 381 provides in
part that all receipts of rents from real estate shall be
79 See note 10 supra.
80 "Section 2. Application of the Act-Powers of Settlor.
This act shall govern the ascertainment of income and principal, and the
apportionment of receipts and expenses between tenants and remaindermen,
in all cases where a principal has been established with or, unless otherwise
stated hereinafter, without the interposition of a trust; except that in the
establishment of the principal provision may be made touching all matters
covered by this act, and the person establishing the principal may himself
direct the manner of ascertainment of income and principal and the appor-
tionment of receipts and expenses or grant discretion to the trustee or other
person to do so, and such provision and direction, where not otherwise con-
trary to law, shall control notwithstanding this act."
81 "Section 3. Income and Principal-Disposition.
(1) All receipts of money or other property paid or delivered as rent of
realty or hire of personalty or dividends on corporate shares payable other
than in shares of the corporation itself, or interest on money loaned, or
interest on or the rental or use value of property wrongfully withheld or
tortiously damaged, or otherwise in return for the use of principal, shall be
deemed income unless otherwise expressly provided in this act."
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deemed income. This would dispose of the troublesome
question of whether or not it were fairer to the remain-
derman to set up reserves for the deterioration or
obsolescence of buildings. In several cases where the
question has been judicially determined, it has been held
improper to accumulate income to amortize the loss from
the obsolescence or the deterioration of buildings situated
upon real estate which is rented.82 This provision of the
Act is consonant with the accepted practice.
There has been a difference of view on the matter of
dividends of stock of a corporation other than the one
which makes the declaration of the dividend. This Act,
in Section 5,83 follows the Massachusetts rule which holds
such dividends to be income when paid from surplus.84
In some states, they are held to be principal if the stock
or other security represented was acquired by the declar-
ing corporation before the creation of the trust,85 but are
held to be income if acquired after the creation of the
82 In re Edgar's Will, 282 N. Y. S. 795 (1935) ; Whitcomb v. Blair, 25
F. (2d) 528 (1928); Hubbell v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 446 (1931); Laflin v.
Com. of Int. Rev., 69 F. (2d) 460 (1934) ; Smith v. Keteltas, 70 N. Y. S.
1065 (1901) ; on a boat, In re Chapman, 66 N. Y. S. 235 (1900).
83 "Section 5. Corporate Dividends and Share Rights.
(1) All dividends on shares of a corporation forming a part of the
principal which are payable in the shares of the corporation shall be deemed
principal. Subject to the provisions of this section, all dividends payable
otherwise than in the shares of the corporation itself, including ordinary and
extraordinary dividends and dividends payable in shares or other securities or
obligations of corporations other than the declaring corporation, shall be
deemed income. Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a
dividend either in cash or in the shares of the declaring corporation, it shall
be considered as a cash dividend and deemed income, irrespective of the
choice made by the trustee."
84 Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N. E. 761 (1931) ; Leland v.
Hayden, 102 Mass. 542 (1869) ; Gray v. Hemenway, 212 Mass. 239, 98 N. E.
789 (1912) and 223 Mass. 293, 111 N. E. 713 (1916) ; Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Jameson, 256 Mass. 179, 152 N. E. 52 (1926); Gray v. Hemenway, 268
Mass. 515, 168 N. E. 102 (1929); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 341 Ill. 461, 173 N. E.
491 (1930).
85 U. S. Trust Co. of New York v. Heye, 224 N. Y. 242, 120 N. E. 645
(1918); In re Megrue, 224 N. Y. 284, 120 N. E. 651 (1918) ; Bourne v.
Bourne, 240 N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180 (1925) ; Macy v. Ladd, 219 N. Y. S.
449 (1926) ; In re Flinn's Estate, 310 Pa. 206, 165 A. 31 (1932) ; Koehler v.
Koehler, 99 N. J. Eq. 141, 132 A. 751 (1926) ; Foard v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 122 Md. 476, 89 A. 724 (1914).
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trust.8 By allocating to income all receipts except stock
of the declaring corporation, the Massachusetts rule has
the advantage of being easier to apply, because it does
not necessitate inquiry into the time of acquisition of the
stock or the source of the dividend. It may be that the
so-called "New York" or "Pennsylvania" rule deals
more equitably with the remainderman, but the technical
distinction would perhaps often be lost sight of by in-
dividual trustees, who are not administering trusts pro-
fessionally and to whom it would not occur to consult
with legal counsel on dividend matters.
Similar differences of opinion exist as to extraordinary-
cash dividends, and the Massachusetts rule that cash divi-
dends (other than liquidating dividends), however large,
belong to income has been followed in this Act.8 7 The
majority of decisions, however, take into consideration
the "intact value" of the principal and apportion extra-
ordinary cash dividends between income and principal
if the dividend was earned in part before the creation
of the trust.8
The problem of apportioning accrued income between
Hiie tewiant anu reuiurulrmari or successive lie tenants
86 Sturgis v. Roche, 217 N. Y. S. 79 (1926) ; Macy v. Ladd, 219 N. Y. S.
449 (1926); In re Lavanburg's Estate, 224 N. Y. S. 718 (1927); Cox v.
Gaulbert's Trustee, 148 Ky. 407, 147 S. W. 25 (1912).
87 Talbot v. Milliken, 221 Mass. 367, 108 N. E. 1060 (1915); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927) ; Lannin v. Buckley,
256 Mass. 78, 152 N. E. 71 (1926) ; Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868);
Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 10 S. Ct. 1057, 34 L. Ed. 525 (1890);
Lanston v. Lanston, 290 F. 315 (1923) ; Appeal of Harding, 111 Conn. 325,
149 A. 846 (1930) ; Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 60 A. 117, 69 L. R. A. 76
(1905); Jackson v. Maddox, 136 Ga. 31, 70 S. E. 865 (1911) ; DeKoven v.
Alsop, 205 I1. 309, 68 N. E. 930 (1903) ; Lloyd v. Lloyd, 341 Ill. 461, 173
N. E. 491 (1930) ; Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 208 Ind.
432, 196 N. E. 324 (1935) ; Thatcher v. Thatcher, 117 Me. 331, 104 A. 515
(1918) ; In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 225 N. W. 878 (1929); Hayes v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S. W. 91 (1927); Lamb v.
Lehmann, 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N. E. 276 (1924).
88 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham, 42 R. I. 365, 107 A. 209
(1919); Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368 (1857) ; In re Nirdlinger's Estate,
290 Pa. 457, 139 A. 200 (1927) ; In re Duffill's Estate, 180 Cal. 748, 183 P.
337 (1919) ; In re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 375, 197 P. 90 (1921);
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 159 Md. 175, 150 A. 282 (1930) ; In re Jenkins' Estate,
199 Wis. 131, 225 N. W. 733 (1929) ; In re Dittmer's Estate, 197 Wis. 304,
222 N. W. 323 (1928).
THE UNIFORM ACTS RELATING TO TRUSTS
has also been realistically and practically dealt with in
Section 4.89 Rents were not apportionable at common
law,9" but they have been made so by statute in many
states. It has been doubtful if any part of the interest on
coupon bonds was payable to the income beneficiary or
his estate if he died before maturity of the coupon. The
Maine and Massachusetts rules91 in this particular were
based upon the theory that each coupon is a separate
negotiable obligation and is not severable and becomes
income only on the maturity of the coupon. Massa-
chusetts has changed this by statute.2 But in most states
where the question has arisen, interest on coupon bonds
has been held apportionable.9R The provision of this Act
-which apportions interest represented by coupons will find
89 "Section 4. Apportionment of Income.
Whenever a tenant shall have the right to income from periodic payments,
which shall include rent, interest on loans, and annuities, but shall not include
dividends on corporate shares, and such right shall cease and determine by
death or in any other manner at a time other than the date when such
periodic payments should be paid, he or his personal representative shall be
entitled to that portion of any such income next payable which amounts to
the same percentage thereof as the time elapsed from the last due date of
such periodic payments to and including the day of the determination of his
right is of the total period during which such income would normally accrue.
The remaining income shall be paid to the person next entitled to income by
the terms of the transaction by which the principal was established. But no
action shall be brought by the trustee or tenant to recover such apportioned
income or any portion thereof until after the day on which it would have
become due to the tenant but for the determination of the right of the tenant
entitled thereto. The provisions of this section shall apply whether an
ultimate remainderman is specifically named or not. Likewise when the right
of the first tenant accrues at a time other than the payment dates of such
periodic payments, he shall only receive that portion of such income which
amounts to the same percentage thereof as the time during which he has been
so entitled is of the total period during which such income would normally
accrue; the balance shall be a part of the principal."
90 Greene v. Huntington, 73 Conn. 106, 46 A. 883 (1900); Huff v.
Latimer, 33 S. C. 255, 11 S. E. 758 (1890) ; Quinn v. Madigan, 65 N. H. 8,
17 A. 976 (1889).
91 Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178, 23 Am. Rep. 261 (1876); Union
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dudley, 104 Me. 297, 72 A. 166 (1908).
92 Rev. Laws of Mass. 1932, Ch. 197, § 27.
93 Kahn v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 137 Cal. App. 775, 27 P.
(2d) 672 (1933) ; Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Marsh, 87 Conn. 384, 87 A. 865
(1913); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Chapman, 20 Del. Ch. 67, 171 A. 222
(1934); U. S. Trust Co. v. Tobias, 21 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 392 (1888);
Equitable Trust Co. v. Miller, 189 N. Y. S. 293 (1921), affirmed in 233 N. Y.
650, 135 N. E. 955 (1922) ; Wilson's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 344 (1885).
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ready acceptance in those states where neither a decided
case nor a statute now controls the situation. Annuities
and interest on savings deposits, which were not appor-
tionable at common law,9 4 are likewise made so by the
Act, which, it is submitted, fairly reflects most settlors'
wishes, for income apportioned to the life tenant fre-
quently is all that is available to pay the expenses of
last illness and burial of the deceased life tenant. There
is this draw-back, that by increasing the life tenant's
right to accrued income it may become necessary in many
cases to open administration of the deceased's estate to
dispose of this income, when administration of the estate
would not otherwise be necessary.
A slight difference of opinion also exists in determining
the right of the estate of a deceased life tenant to share
in dividends which have been declared after the death
of the life tenant out of earnings during the period of the
life tenancy, or before the death of the life tenant, but
payable after his death.9 5 Section 5 of the Uniform Prin-
cipal and Income Act9" establishes the right to the divi-
dend by the date specified by the corporation to determine
94 Savings deposits: Greene v. Huntington, 73 Conn. 106, 46 A. 833
(1900). Annuities: Nehls v. Sauer, 119 Iowa 440, 93 N. W. 346 (1903);
Chase v. Darby, 110 Mich. 314, 68 N. W. 159 (1896) ; Henry v. Henderson,
81 Miss. 743, 33 So. 960 (1903) ; Kearney v. Cruikshank, 117 N. Y. 95, 22
N. E. 580 (1889) ; Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547, 65 A. 1056 (1907).
95 In New York and Pennsylvania dividends are apportionable by statute.
In New Jersey there is a rebuttable presumption that dividends are earned
uniformly from day to day and are apportioned accordingly unless the pre-
sumption is rebutted. See Graves v. Graves, 115 N. J. Eq. 547, 171 A. 681
(1934) ; Lang v. Lang's Ex'r, 57 N. J. Eq. 325, 41 A. 705 (1898) ; Hagedorn
v. Arens, 106 N. J. Eq. 377, 150 A. 4 (1930) ; Beattie v. Gedney, 99 N. J.
Eq. 207, 132 A. 652 (1926).
The remaining states do not permit apportionment of dividends. Union and
New Haven Trust Co. v. Watrous, 109 Conn. 268, 146 A. 727 (1929);
Mann v. Anderson, 106 Ga. 818, 32 S. E. 870 (1899) ; In re Northern Central
Ry. Div. Cases, 126 Md. 16, 94 A. 338 (1915) ; Nutter v. Andrews, 246 Mass.
224, 142 N. E. 67 (1923) ; In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 A. 200
(1927) ; In re Barron's Will, 163 Wis. 275, 155 N. W. 1087 (1916) ; note,
83 A. L. R. 1261.
96 "(5) In applying this section the date when a dividend accrues to the
person who is entitled to it shall be held to be the date specified by the
corporation as the one on which the stockholders entitled thereto are
determined, or in default thereof the date of declaration of the dividend."
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stockholders of record, or if none is specified, then by the
date of declaring the dividend.
Section 597 also provides that all dividends of stock of
the declaring corporation shall be allocated to principal.
This is the rule followed in most of the states."8 But in
Kentucky and Delaware99 such dividends were distrib-
utable as income. The Pennsylvania rule,100 which has
been adopted by many states, is that the presumption is
that a stock dividend is declared out of earnings and
belongs to the life tenant, but the intact book value of the
original issue of stock must be maintained and it behooves
the trustee to ascertain to what extent the surplus against
which the new stock is issued represents earnings prior
to the creation of the trust. It is obvious that the Penn-
sylvania and Kentucky rules favor the life tenant, but
the rule adopted for this Section has the advantage of
greater certainty over the Pennsylvania rule.
97 "(1) All dividends on shares of a corporation forming a part of the
principal which are payable in the shares of the corporation shall be deemed
principal. Subject to the provisions of this section, all dividends payable
otherwise than in the shares of the corporation itself, including ordinary and
extraordinary dividends and dividends payable in shares or other securities
or obligations of corporations other than the declaring corporation, shall be
deemed income. Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a
dividend either in cash or in the shares of the declaring corporation, it shall
be considered as a cash dividend and deemed income, irrespective of the
choice made by the trustee."
98 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927);
Lannin v. Buckley, 256 Mass. 78, 152 N. 1,. 71 (1926) ; Coolidge v. Grant,
251 Mass. 352, 146 N. E. 719 (1925); Eastman v. State Bank of Chicago,
259 Ill. App. 607 (1931) ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52
R. I. 277, 160 A. 465 (1932).
99 Lightfoot v. Beard, 230 Ky. 488, 20 S. W. (2d) 90 (1929) ; Robinson v.
Robinson's Ex'r, 221 Ky. 245, 298 S. W. 701 (1927) ; Goff v. Evans, 217 Ky.
664, 290 S. W. 490 (1927) ; Cox v. Gaulbert's Trustee, 148 Ky. 407, 147
S. W. 25 (1912); Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892); Dupont v.
Peyton, 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 A. 149 (1927) ; Bryan v. Aiken, 10 Del. Ch. 1,
82 A. 817 (1912); Ortiz v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 18 Del. Ch.
439, 159 A. 376 (1931).
100 In re Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 162 A. 295 (1932) ; In re
Duffill's Estate, 180 Cal. 748, 183 P. 337 (1919) ; Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Iowa
215, 110 N. W. 599 (1907) ; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 159 Md. 175, 150 A. 282
(1930); Goodwin v. McGaughy, 108 Minn. 248, 122 N. W. 6 (1909) ; In re
Jenkins' Estate, 199 Wis. 131, 225 N. W. 733 (1929) ; In re Dittmer's Estate,
197 Wis. 304, 222 N. W. 323 (1928).
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In most states, excepting Pennsylvania, California, and
New Hampshire, 1 1 stock subscription rights are deemed
principal, and Section 5 of this Act 102 so provides. Para-
graph (3) of Section 5 follows the more generally
accepted view with regard to liquidating dividends, com-
promising slightly in favor of the intact-value-of-prin-
cipal view, by allocating to income declared and arrears
of guaranteed or preferred dividends. But it performs its
greatest service in clarifying the situation in connection
with dividends of a corporation in which a depletion of
the principal assets takes place, as in mining, lumbering,
or oil wells, where the amount of depletion may be diffi-
cult to determine and cover long periods of time. In such
case the Act provides that the declaration of the corpora-
tion shall be accepted as to the amount of depletion.
Anomalous situations, so far as case law is concerned,
are the stock distributions upon reorganizations under
Section 77(b). Paragraph (4) of Section 5103 is general
in its terms and would, it is submitted, make disposition
of such distributions to principal.
101 Buder v. Franz, 27 F. (2d) 101 (1928) ; DeKoven v. Alsop, 205 Ill.
309, 68 N. E. 930 (1903) ; Powell v. Madison Safe Dep. & Trust Co., 208
Ind. 432, 196 N. E. 324 (1935) ; Lauman v. Foster, 157 Iowa 275, 135 N. W.
14 (1912); Richmond v. Richmond, 196 N. Y. 535, 89 N. E. 1111 (1909);
In re Jenkin's Estate, 199 Wis. 131, 225 N. W. 733 (1929); In re Merrill's
Estate, 196 Wis. 351, 220 N. W. 215 (1928). But see In re Schnur's Estate,
32 P. (2d) 970 (Cal., 1934); Rockwell v. Dow, 85 N. H. 58, 154 A. 229
(1931) ; In re Hostetter's Estate, 319 Pa. 572, 181 A. 567 (1935) ; Jones v.
Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 140 A. 862 (1928).
102 "(2) All rights to subscribe to the shares or other securities or obliga-
tions of a corporation accruing on account of the ownership of shares or
other securities in such corporation, and the proceeds of any sale of such
rights, shall be deemed principal. All rights to subscribe to the shares or
other securities or obligations of a corporation accruing on account of the
ownership of shares or other securities in another corporation, and the pro-
ceeds of any sale of such rights, shall be deemed income."
103 "(4) Where a corporation succeeds another by merger, consolidation
or reorganization or otherwise acquires its assets, and the corporate shares
of the succeeding corporation are issued to the shareholders of the original
corporation in like proportion to, or in substitution for, their shares of the
original corporation, the two corporations shall be considered a single
corporation in applying the provisions of this section. But two corporations
shall not be considered a single corporation under this section merely because
one owns corporate shares of or otherwise controls or directs the other."
THE UNIFORM ACTS RELATING TO TRUSTS
Section 6104 follows the minority view in the United
States in charging premiums wholly to principal."5 The
majority view adheres to the amortization of premiums
against income,0 6 but this sometimes works a hardship
on life tenants at times when good bonds uniformly sell
at a premium. This view also has elements of uncertainty
when premium bonds are sold at a premium before matur-
ity and reinvestment is made in other premium bonds.
The disposition of the proceeds from wasting assets
from real estate has always presented problems of alloca-
tion when such allocation was dependent upon whether
the well or mine was opened at the creation of the trust.
Although the rule prescribed by Section 9 of the Act'07
seems to be somewhat arbitrary and to be based upon an
insubstantial distinction between rent from a lease and
returns by way of royalty, it is not altogether harsh to
the life tenant and appears to be workable.
104 "Section 6. Premium and Discount Bonds.
Where any part of the principal consists of bonds or other obligations for
the payment of money, they shall be deemed principal at their inventory value
or in default thereof at their market value at the time the principal was
established, or at their cost where purchased later, regardless of their par or
maturity value; and upon their respective maturities or upon their sale any
loss or gain realized thereon shall fall upon or enure to the principal."
105 Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892) ; In re Penn-Gaskell's
Estate, 208 Pa. 346, 57 A. 715 (1904); Whitridge v. Williams, 71 Md. 105,
17 A. 938 (1889).
106 In re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 648, 198 P. 209, 16 A. L. R. 520
(1921); Curtis v. Osborn, 79 Conn. 555, 65 A. 968 (1907); New England
Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532, 4 N. E. 69 (1886); Ballantine v. Young,
74 N. J. Eq. 572, 70 A. 668 (1908) ; In re Stevens, 187 N. Y. 471, 80 N. E.
358, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 814 (1907) ; In re Allis' Estate, 123 Wis. 223, 101
N. W. 365 (1904) ; In re Wells' Estate, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174 (1913).
107 "Section 9. Disposition of Natural Resources.
Where any part of the principal consists of property in lands from which
may be taken timber, minerals, oils, gas or other natural resources and
the trustee or tenant is authorized by law or by the terms of the transaction
by which the principal was established to sell, lease or otherwise develop such
natural resources, and no provision is made for the disposition of the net
proceeds thereof after the payment of expenses and carrying charges on such
property, such proceeds, if received as rent on a lease, shall be deemed
income, but if received as consideration, whether as royalties or otherwise,
for the permanent severance of such natural resources from the lands, shall
be deemed principal to be invested to produce income. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to abrogate or extend any right which may other-
wise have accrued by law to a tenant to develop or work such natural
resources for his own benefit."
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
There has been very little law to guide trustees in the
matter of disposing of the proceeds from unproductive
real estate. A few cases hold that the income beneficiary
was entitled to some portion of the net proceeds,'018 but
in states where the question was not judicially deter-
mined, the tendency of cautious trustees more generally
was in the direction of treating the entire proceeds as
principal. Section 11109 follows the rule of apportionment
to the extent that the net proceeds represent profit and is
a more equitable arrangement for income beneficiaries.
With the full protection of this provision, after statutory
enactment, there should be no reluctance to apportion the
proceeds of sale.
The provisions of the Act regarding expenses of the
trust follow the generally accepted rule that the regularly
recurring charges should be paid out of income,10 but
108 Kinmonth v. Brigham, 5 Allen (Mass.) 270 (1862) ; Frankel v.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 209 N. Y. 553, 103 N. E. 1124 (1913) ; In re
Nordlinger's Estate, 273 N. Y. S. 284 (1934) ; Gould v. Gould, 213 N. Y. S.
286 (1925) ; Blakeley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. St. 425, 34 A. 564 (1896) ; Wilson
v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (1897).
109 "Section 11. Unproductive Estate.
(1) Where any part of a principal in the possession of a trustee consists
of realty or personalty which for more than a year and until disposed of
as hereinafter stated has not produced an average net income of at least one
per centum per annum of its fair inventory value or in default thereof its
market value at the time the principal was established or of its cost where
purchased later, and the trustee is under a duty to change the form of the
investment as soon as it may be done without sacrifice of value and such
change is delayed, but is made before the principal is finally distributed, then
the tenant, or in case of his death his personal representative, shall be entitled
to share in the net proceeds received from the property as delayed income
to the extent hereinafter stated.
(2) Such income shall be the difference between the net proceeds received
from the property and the amount which, had it been placed at simple
interest at the rate of five per centum per annum for the period during which
the change was delayed, would have produced the net proceeds at the time
of change, but in no event shall such income be more than the amount by
which the net proceeds exceed the fair inventory value of the property or in
default thereof its market value at the time the principal was established or
its cost where purchased later. The net proceeds shall consist of the gross
proceeds received from the property less any expenses incurred in disposing
of it and less all carrying charges which have been paid out of principal
during the period while it has been unproductive."
110 Rothschild v. Weinthel, 191 Ind. 85, 131 N. E. 917, 132 N. E. 687
(1921) ; Dickinson v. Henderson, 122 Mich. 583, 81 N. W. 583 (1900);
Goodwin v. McGaughy, 108 Minn. 248, 122 N. W. 6 (1909); Melvin v.
Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 235 S. W. 107 (1921); Woodward v. James, 115
THE UNIFORM ACTS RELATING TO TRUSTS
extraordinary costs and expenses incurred in the protec-
tion, sale, or enhancement of principal shall be charged
against principal."1
The apportionment of taxes between successive life
tenants or between life tenant and remainderman finds
authority in a few cases" 2 although taxes have been held
not apportionable in others."'
Whether or not one concludes that the rights of income
beneficiary and remainderman have been as equitably
adjusted as is possible, one must admit that there is a
considerable gain to all in a definite rule of law to guide
the trustee and that the Uniform Principal and Income
Act has disposed of the major problems in this field. This
act imposes no additional burdens upon the creator of
the trust or the cestuis. It does apprise the draftsman
who is preparing the trust instrument that certain results
will follow unless the settlor expresses himself in contrary
fashion. It does not deter the settlor from making a pro-
vision as to the disposal of income contrary to the act
or contrary to his own wishes, except as he may violate
certain laws which, in any event, are fundamental to his
disposing of property in trust.
N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150 (1889) ; Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v. Rhoads,
353 Ill. 131, 187 N. E. 139 (1933).
"ll Cogswell v. Weston, 228 Mass. 219, 117 N. E. 37 (1917); In re
Duffill's Estate, 188 Cal. 536, 206 P. 42 (1922); Commercial Trust Co. of
New Jersey v. Gould, 105 N. J. Eq. 727, 149 A. 590 (1930) ; Patterson v.
Old Dominion Trust Co., 156 Va. 763, 159 S. E. 168 (1931) ; In re Cole's
Estate, 102 Wis. 1, 78 N. W. 402 (1899); In re Bechtoldt's Estate, 266
N. Y. S. 408 (1933) ; In re Dare's Estate, 196 Cal. 29, 235 P. 725 (1925) ;
Gould v. Gould, 213 N. Y. S. 286 (1925) ; Commercial Trust Co. of New
Jersey Bank v. Gould, 105 N. J. Eq. 727, 149 A. 590 (1930).
112 In re Hone's Estate, 274 N. Y. S. 101 (1934) ; Matter of Johnson's
Estate, 84 Utah 168, 35 P. (2d) 305 (1934), discussed in 21 Va. L. Rev. 239
and N. Y. Law Jour., Aug. 11, 1934; In re Schulz's Estate, 231 N. Y. S. 677
(1928) ; In re Fest's Estate, 28 W. N. Cas. 415 (Pa., 1891) ; In re Crump's
Estate, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 286 (1893).
11" Holmes v. Taber, 91 Mass. 246 (1864) ; Brodie v. Parsons, 23 Ky. L.
Rep. 831, 64 S. W. 426 (1901) ; Robinson v. Bowler, 18 Ohio C. C. N. S.
372; Lantz' Estate Y. McDaniel, 99 Ind. App. 233, 190 N. E. 130 (1934).
The foregoing charged taxes against life tenant, at time when they were
assessed. In O'Donnell v. Mathews, 221 Mo. App. 657, 284 S. W. 204
(1926), held although assessed during life tenancy, they were not due and
payable until after life tenant's death and were therefore charged against
the next estate.
